Criminal crews blend cyber access with physical theft. They infiltrate trucking and logistics firms, deploy remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, and then alter dispatch workflows to steal freight. Because these tools are legitimate and often signed, traditional controls hesitate to flag them. Consequently, defenders must validate where RMM lands, which privileges it receives, and how it changes booking and pickup operations.
๐๐ก๐ซ๐๐๐ญ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ซ๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฐ: ๐๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ ๐๐๐ซ๐ ๐จ-๐๐ก๐๐๐ญ ๐๐ง๐๐๐ฅ๐๐ซ
Operators first secure access that looks routine. They compromise email accounts to hijack active conversations. They spear-phish carriers and brokers. They post fraudulent load listings from hacked load-board accounts. Next, when a target engages, they deliver booby-trapped MSI/EXE installers that deploy legitimate RMM platforms such as ScreenConnect, SimpleHelp, PDQ Connect, Fleetdeck, N-able, or LogMeIn Resolve. Sometimes they chain them PDQ Connect drops and installs ScreenConnect and SimpleHelp to persist and diversify remote control paths. Once inside, they survey systems, deploy credential harvesters, and pivot to portals that handle booking, dispatch, and notifications.
๐๐ซ๐ข๐ฆ๐ข๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฃ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐: ๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ง ๐๐ข๐ ๐ข๐ญ๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ก๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐ฌ
After foothold, crews change bookings, block dispatcher notifications, and add attacker devices to phone extensions. Then they bid on legitimate loads under compromised identities, coordinate pickups, and move goods off network-visible routes. Because the operation rides on valid accounts, logistics systems often record the actions as normal business flow.
๐๐๐๐ก๐ง๐ข๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐ซ๐๐๐ค๐๐จ๐ฐ๐ง: ๐๐จ๐ฐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ง๐๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ญ๐ข๐๐ค๐ฌ
Phishing commonly drops a signed installer. Security stacks accept it because the payload is a legitimate RMM. Installers register services, open firewall rules, and set auto-start. Meanwhile, the operator enrolls the host into a tenant they control. Next, they blend with IT workflows: remote shell, file transfer, screen control, and process management. Finally, they deploy credential tools, harvest browser and portal creds, and validate access to broker portals, TMS/dispatch apps, and email.
๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ข๐๐๐๐ญ๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ง๐๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ
Expect new services named like support tools, MSI install events, scheduled tasks, and unfamiliar RMM domains shortly after enrollment. Watch for dual RMM presence (for example, PDQ Connect plus ScreenConnect/SimpleHelp) landing within minutes of each other. Track mailbox rules, new MFA devices, and dispatcher phone extension changes. On load boards, look for atypical IPs, new device fingerprints, and sign-ins at odd hours.
๐๐๐จ๐ฉ๐ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ซ๐ ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐
Campaigns hit carriers, freight brokerages, and integrated supply-chain providers, from small fleets to national firms. Moreover, crews favor high-turnover commodities such as food and beverage, since resale moves quickly and inspection cycles create cover.
๐๐๐ญ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง: ๐๐ซ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ซ ๐๐ก๐๐๐ค๐ฅ๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ
Start with endpoints, then pivot to the business layer.
โข Query recent MSI/EXE installations that created services with vendor-like names; correlate with first outbound to RMM control domains.
โข Hunt for dual RMM installs within one change window (PDQ Connect โ ScreenConnect/SimpleHelp).
โข Alert on new remote-control enrollments and unapproved tenants; verify the approver and reason.
โข Review browser credential access telemetry; look for rapid harvesting after enrollment.
โข Compare dispatch and load-board logins with geolocation and device fingerprints; flag notification blocks or phone extension changes.
โข Baseline booking cadence and detect deletions followed by fast re-booking from unfamiliar devices.
๐๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ซ๐๐๐ง๐ข๐ง๐ : ๐๐ญ๐จ๐ฉ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ฅ๐๐ง๐-๐๐ง
Block or challenge unsanctioned RMM by policy. Require allow-lists for remote tools and enforce MFA + device trust for load-board and dispatch portals. Monitor service creation and tenant enrollment; quarantine hosts that enroll into unknown tenants. Rotate compromised mailboxes, remove rogue inbox rules, and reset session tokens. Finally, restrict credential dumping tools, disable browser password stores where feasible, and log password manager usage to reduce harvest value.
๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ข๐ง๐๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐๐ฆ๐ฉ๐๐๐ญ: ๐ ๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐๐๐ฅ๐๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐ฒ ๐๐๐ฉ๐ฌ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐ฌ
When RMM blends in, the enterprise loses deterrence. Load workflows execute under legitimate accounts, dispatch stays quiet, and cargo exits the chain. Because the exploit path relies on ordinary business software, crude blocking creates downtime. Therefore, precision matters: constrain which RMMs may enroll, control who approves them, and verify where they connect.
๐๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ซ๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ฌ: ๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ค๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐ ๐ฅ๐๐๐ญ๐ฌ
Establish a remote-tool registry tied to MDM/EDR policies. Require change tickets for new remote tools. Instrument load-board and dispatch with risk-based MFA and transaction anomaly alerts. Rehearse booking rollback and notification recovery so dispatch can undo mailbox-level tampering quickly. Above all, separate duties so the person approving RMM cannot manage dispatch.
Attackers donโt need custom malware when signed IT tools deliver stealth. Treat unsanctioned RMM enrollment as a high-severity event, watch for dual-tool chains, and protect the business layer booking, dispatch, notifications where theft actually occurs.
