Matrix Push C2 Hijacks Browser Notifications for Stealth Phishing

Most users barely think about the little pop-up asking to “Allow notifications” when they land on a website. Attackers know that. The Matrix Push C2 framework takes that moment of inattention and converts it into a persistent, browser-native phishing channel, using legitimate web push features as a stealthy command-and-control layer for credential theft, payment fraud, and crypto scams.

WHAT MATRIX PUSH C2 IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

Matrix Push C2 is a browser-centric command-and-control framework marketed to financially motivated threat actors. Instead of relying on email infrastructure or hijacked SMS gateways, the tool abuses standard browser push notification APIs to reach victims directly from their own browsers.

According to public analysis from BlackFog, Matrix Push C2 presents a slick, commercial-style interface that feels like any SaaS marketing dashboard rather than crude “hacker ware.” Attackers log in, design notification content, select templates that imitate brands such as PayPal, MetaMask, TikTok, Netflix, Cloudflare, and others, then push those notifications to subscribed victims through the browser’s own push service. 

Because the notifications arrive from a legitimate browser process, they inherit the user’s existing trust in that surface. As a result, Matrix Push C2 blurs the line between normal UX and an active phishing campaign, while staying largely invisible to traditional security tooling.

HOW MATRIX PUSH C2 HIJACKS BROWSER NOTIFICATIONS

To weaponize web push, the attacker first needs the victim to opt in. That initial step still depends on social engineering, but everything after that runs through standard browser mechanisms.

In a typical flow, the attacker drives traffic to a compromised or malicious site under their control. The site behaves like any normal property that wants to send updates: it calls the browser Notifications API and asks for permission to display alerts. Because this flow mirrors legitimate behavior, users often click “Allow” reflexively.

Once the victim grants permission, the malicious site registers a service worker, creates a Push API subscription, and forwards that subscription data back to the Matrix Push C2 backend. Since these APIs work across major desktop and mobile browsers, Matrix Push functions regardless of platform, as long as the victim’s browser supports web push.

From that point on, the attacker no longer needs to lure the user back to the site. Instead, they can send browser-native phishing prompts that look like login warnings, security notices, payment alerts, or 2FA confirmations. The browser broker delivers these notifications over encrypted push channels that look entirely benign from the network’s perspective.

Because Matrix Push C2 tracks real-time telemetry – IP address, browser and OS version, approximate location, wallet usage, notification history, and online status – the operator sees exactly when a victim is active and can time prompts to moments when interaction is most likely. This real-time insight turns what used to be one-off phishing blasts into optimized, data-driven campaigns.

SUBSCRIPTION C2 FOR MASS PHISHING CAMPAIGNS 

Matrix Push C2 is sold using a tiered subscription model denominated in cryptocurrency. Pricing tiers reported in underground channels range from monthly access to annual licenses, which makes the platform accessible to low-to-mid-tier threat actors, not just organized groups.

The tool’s design targets scale rather than one-off attacks. Operators can:

• Maintain large lists of subscribed victims across multiple campaigns.
• Segment those lists by geography, device, or prior interaction.
• Rotate templates and landing pages without touching the victim’s local environment.

Because the framework is browser-native and fileless, it also pairs naturally with other tools. Campaigns can chain Matrix Push notifications to credential-harvesting pages, multi-channel phishing kits, or malware loaders delivered after the victim authenticates. Public research already describes Matrix Push C2 being used to deliver further payloads and steal data across platforms once the victim engages.

Consequently, Matrix Push C2 fits neatly into the broader phishing-as-a-service and C2-as-a-service ecosystem, where lower-skilled actors rent infrastructure rather than craft techniques themselves.

WHY MATRIX PUSH C2 IS HARD TO DETECT

From a detection standpoint, Matrix Push C2 is attractive to adversaries because it minimizes signals that security tools traditionally rely on. The framework:

• Uses legitimate browser notification and push APIs rather than exploits or binary droppers.
• Delivers content through normal encrypted push traffic routed by browser vendors.
• Avoids installing extensions or standalone executables on the endpoint.

Security controls often treat web push notifications as low-risk UX noise. Research has already shown that users habitually ignore or bypass browser warnings, which gives attackers an opening to abuse notification channels with minimal friction. 

Meanwhile, the only malicious element may be the notification text and destination URL. Because attackers can rotate domains and landing pages quickly, URL-based or domain-reputation systems struggle to keep up. When combined with techniques seen in other campaigns – such as mimicking DDoS-protection pages to trick users into enabling notifications – the result is a stealthy, persistent phishing surface that rides directly on top of “normal” browser behavior.

In practice, Matrix Push C2 exploits a policy gap: browsers treat user-approved notifications as legitimate, security tools deprioritize the channel, and organizations rarely maintain formal policy around web push at all.

HOW MATRIX PUSH C2 FITS INTO THE MODERN PHISHING LANDSCAPE

In today’s threat landscape, phishing rarely stays confined to email. Attackers mix email, SMS, QR codes, voice calls, and web push to construct multi-channel campaigns that bypass single-channel filters. embedding itself inside the browser, right next to the user’s normal workflows. Because notifications appear above whatever the user is doing, they interrupt attention in the same way as legitimate security alerts or payment prompts.

Threat actors can pair Matrix Push-driven notifications with:

• Advanced phishing toolkits that proxy login flows and bypass MFA.
• Malicious extensions that monitor browser behavior or inject additional content.
• Classic credential-harvesting pages and infostealers delivered after notification clicks. 

Because of this, Matrix Push C2 does not need to carry an entire campaign on its own. Instead, it acts as a flexible notification-layer C2 that can point to whatever infrastructure the operator currently favors, from phishing kits to malware loaders.

DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES AGAINST BROWSER-BASED C2 PHISHING

Defending against Matrix Push C2 requires an ecosystem response that touches browser vendors, enterprises, and end users simultaneously.

Browser developers can introduce stronger abuse controls around web push. Reputation-based scoring for notification sources, automatic revocation of noisy or suspicious permissions, and clearer UX for high-risk notification requests all reduce the chance of abusive frameworks at scale. Google-linked research into web hijacking and notification effectiveness has already shown that structured notification programs can meaningfully shift cleanup behavior and risk. 

Enterprises should treat browser notifications as part of their attack surface, not just a UX feature. Security teams can:

• Audit and centrally manage notification permissions on corporate browsers where possible.
• Use browser-security agents or secure enterprise browsers that inspect notification origins and block known malicious services. 
• Integrate web-push telemetry into threat-hunting and SOC workflows alongside email and endpoint data.

Meanwhile, security awareness programs need to explicitly address web push. Training should explain that:

• Users should almost never “Allow” notifications on random sites.
• Notification prompts on pages that look like DDoS checks, captchas, streaming portals, or “update required” screens are high-risk.
• Existing notification permissions should be reviewed and revoked regularly in browser settings.

Finally, cyber threat intelligence teams should track Matrix Push C2 infrastructure in the same way they track other C2 frameworks. As more research emerges and additional campaigns are analyzed, defenders will gain indicators they can block at DNS, proxy, or secure web gateway layers, even if the browser APIs themselves remain legitimate. 

PRACTICAL TAKEAWAYS FOR SECURITY TEAMS 

Matrix Push C2 is not the first tool to abuse browser notification flows, yet it represents a professionalized step forward. It wraps those techniques in a polished C2 portal, subscription model, and template-driven brand impersonation system that any moderately capable threat actor can operate.

Because web push notifications sit at the intersection of browser UX, user behavior, and security tooling blind spots, they provide an ideal delivery rail for phishing and malware. Security teams that still think only in terms of email-centric phishing will miss an entire class of notification-driven attacks.

Therefore, incident responders and blue teams should update playbooks to include:

• Investigation of suspicious notification prompts when users report “pop-ups” or strange browser alerts.
• Checks for unauthorized notification subscriptions during compromise assessments.
• Correlation between reported credential-theft incidents and recent notification interactions.

As tools like Matrix Push C2 propagate through the underground, defenders who understand web push abuse, maintain visibility into browser behavior, and apply layered controls will stand a far better chance of catching campaigns early, before brand-mimicking alerts convert into credentials, wallets, and data loss.

FAQS

Q1: What is Matrix Push C2?
Matrix Push C2 is a browser-native command-and-control framework that abuses web push notifications to deliver phishing prompts and malicious links. Instead of relying on email, it leverages legitimate browser notification APIs to reach victims directly from their own browsers.

Q2: How do attackers enroll victims into Matrix Push C2 campaigns?
Attackers lure users onto malicious or compromised sites and then trigger standard notification-permission prompts. When victims click “Allow,” the site registers a service worker and push subscription, which the Matrix Push backend uses to send phishing notifications later.

Q3: Why is Matrix Push C2 difficult for security tools to detect?
The framework operates entirely through legitimate browser APIs and encrypted push channels. Security products see normal notification traffic, while the only malicious element is the content and destination URL, which attackers can rotate quickly to evade static detection.

Q4: What types of attacks can Matrix Push C2 support?
Matrix Push C2 can support credential theft, payment fraud, cryptocurrency scams and malware delivery. Notifications impersonate trusted brands and link to phishing kits, multi-factor-bypass toolkits or malware loaders hosted on external infrastructure.

Q5: How can organizations reduce the risk of Matrix Push-style attacks?
Organizations should centrally manage browser-notification permissions on corporate endpoints, deploy browser-security controls that monitor notification origins, and train users to reject unsolicited notification prompts. They should also integrate web-push telemetry into threat-hunting workflows, block known Matrix Push C2 infrastructure at network layers and ensure incident-response playbooks explicitly cover malicious notification enrollment and cleanup.