Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) now wants major webmail providers to turn on two-factor authentication (2FA) by default instead of treating it as a hidden, optional feature. The agency links that demand directly to a simple reality: attackers still treat email inboxes as one of the easiest and most valuable ways to pivot into identities, financial accounts, and entire organizations.
Additionally, BSI’s new whitepaper on secure webmail lays out concrete expectations for 2FA by default, modern password policy, usable recovery flows, and clear communication with users. Instead of pushing the burden onto people who rarely understand the nuances of account security, Germany wants providers to design secure choices into the service from the start.
From a security team’s point of view, this move fits a broader pattern in Europe. Regulators and national agencies keep nudging providers toward strong authentication, passkeys, and phishing-resistant flows, while threat actors continue to harvest passwords and session tokens at industrial scale.
𝐁𝐒𝐈’𝐬 𝐰𝐞𝐛𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐩𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐫: 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐨𝐩𝐭-𝐢𝐧 𝟐𝐅𝐀 𝐭𝐨 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐝𝐞𝐟𝐚𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬
Germany already knows that awareness campaigns alone do not move the needle enough. A government study found that only about a third of users actually enable two-factor authentication on their accounts, and adoption even trends downward compared to earlier years.
Because of that, BSI uses the whitepaper to push for a different model: security by default. Instead of burying 2FA behind obscure settings menus, providers should ship webmail accounts with default 2FA, passkeys, or strong biometric verification already active. Users can still manage factors, but they do not start from a weak baseline.
Furthermore, the whitepaper links authentication to other controls that matter for webmail security. BSI wants providers to align password rules with modern recommendations, avoid outdated complexity myths, and support checks for compromised passwords. At the same time, it urges vendors to harden backend infrastructure around those accounts, because strong 2FA means less if attackers compromise weak session management or recovery flows.
𝐖𝐡𝐲 “𝟐𝐅𝐀 𝐛𝐲 𝐝𝐞𝐟𝐚𝐮𝐥𝐭” 𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐦𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐦𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐜𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐢𝐠𝐧
From a threat-model perspective, 2FA by default for webmail providers shifts the entire baseline. Right now, many attackers assume that at least some percentage of inboxes still rely on just a password. Phishing, credential stuffing, and password-stealing malware all exploit that assumption. As long as providers treat 2FA as an obscure toggle, that assumption remains correct.
However, when providers deploy default 2FA or passkeys at scale, opportunistic attackers lose a huge tranche of easy targets. Credential dumps, reused passwords, and basic phishing kits lose value, because login flows demand a second factor or a cryptographic challenge that those tools cannot easily bypass.
Additionally, default 2FA supports better email security further up the stack. Threat actors who cannot easily take over inboxes struggle to reset passwords at other services, approve fraudulent login prompts, or intercept sensitive notifications. In effect, secure webmail becomes a control point that protects identity, payments, and cloud accounts.
Finally, default 2FA changes user behavior over time. When every major provider enables two-factor authentication out of the box, users start to treat verification codes, authenticator apps, or passkeys as a normal part of login rather than a confusing extra step. That normalization matters more than another banner ad about “strong passwords”.
𝐏𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐤𝐞𝐲𝐬, 𝐛𝐢𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐩𝐡𝐢𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠-𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝐢𝐧𝐬
Germany’s push does not stop at one-time codes. The BSI paper explicitly highlights passkeys and biometric authentication as first-class options for webmail login. That emphasis aligns directly with guidance from ENISA and several national cybersecurity centers, which now treat phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication as the real goal, not just any 2FA.
Because passkeys bind credentials to devices and specific services, they eliminate many classes of credential phishing. Even when a user clicks on a fake login page, the passkey challenge fails or never triggers, because the origin does not match. Meanwhile, modern biometric login on secure hardware turns everyday device unlock flows into a usable second factor for email.
Additionally, this approach reduces friction for non-technical users. Instead of juggling long passwords and SMS codes, people simply unlock their phone or laptop and approve access. Over time, that model supports both secure webmail and better digital inclusion, exactly the balance BSI highlights when it frames email security as part of “digital participation” and “digital sovereignty” in Germany.
𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲 𝐟𝐥𝐨𝐰𝐬: 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐰𝐞𝐚𝐤 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐢𝐧 𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐰𝐞𝐛𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐬
Security teams often obsess over login flows and then ignore the recovery journey. Attackers do not. They repeatedly abuse lost-password flows, weak identity checks, and outdated backup channels to regain access after a provider locks down direct login attempts.
Because of that, BSI’s whitepaper pays particular attention to account recovery for webmail. It calls for clear, transparent, and always-available recovery mechanisms that still resist account takeover, even when attackers tamper with stored data. That requirement forces providers to rethink how they use backup email addresses, phone numbers, and knowledge-based questions.
Additionally, robust recovery flows become critical when providers enforce 2FA by default. If users cannot recover an account after they lose a phone or authenticator app, they will lobby to weaken security controls or disable them entirely. To prevent that regression, providers must combine secure identity verification, documented processes, and multiple communication channels that support a secure, user-friendly path back into the account.
𝐇𝐨𝐰 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐦𝐨𝐯𝐞 𝐚𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐨𝐮𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞 𝐆𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐲
Even though BSI only regulates Germany, its webmail security guidance lands in a global ecosystem. Many regional and privacy-focused providers already treat secure authentication as a core selling point, and some German services advertise strong 2FA, anonymous registration, and hardened infrastructure as competitive features.
Consequently, BSI’s push for 2FA by default for webmail providers adds pressure on international players that operate within the EU, handle European personal data, or care about alignment with ENISA and NIS2 expectations. When a national security agency explicitly calls for default strong authentication, “optional 2FA buried three menus deep” looks harder to justify.
Additionally, large providers know that policy trends rarely stop at one border. If Germany successfully frames email security as a pillar of digital sovereignty, other countries can reuse the same language when they update their own consumer-protection rules or telecom obligations. That dynamic already plays out with MFA guidance from ENISA, the UK’s NCSC, and several data protection authorities.
𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐭𝐞𝐚𝐦𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐈𝐒𝐎𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐝𝐨 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬
For defenders inside organizations, BSI’s stance offers leverage rather than just another headline. Security teams that already push for two-factor authentication and default 2FA on corporate or consumer webmail can now point at concrete national guidance instead of vague best practices.
First, teams can map their current webmail provider security posture. That review should cover how default settings look for new users, which factors the service supports (TOTP, push, passkeys, biometrics), and how recovery flows handle lost devices. During that review, teams should document any gaps between provider configurations and BSI-style secure defaults.
Next, CISOs can fold those findings into vendor risk management. When contracts or renewals come up, they can require clear commitments around 2FA by default, passkey roadmaps, and phishing-resistant authentication. They can also insist on metrics: percentage of accounts with strong factors enabled, time-to-detect compromised inboxes, and process maturity for incident response.
Additionally, organizations that run their own mail gateways or webmail frontends can treat BSI’s recommendations as a checklist. They can harden login flows, adopt passkeys where client support allows, tighten rate limits, and audit every recovery path that touches email identities. At the same time, they can update user education material to match this model: less focus on memorizing complex passwords, more emphasis on protecting factors and reporting suspicious prompts.
Finally, security leads should tie this story back to executives as part of a broader email-risk narrative. When leadership understands that Germany treats email security and 2FA as part of digital sovereignty, they grasp that inbox protection goes far beyond spam filters. That framing often unlocks budget and political capital for deeper changes.
𝐏𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐩𝐬 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐰𝐞𝐛𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐰𝐡𝐨 𝐰𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐜𝐡 𝐮𝐩
If you operate a webmail platform, BSI’s message reads less like a suggestion and more like a roadmap. Providers that want to align with this Germany 2FA by default webmail push can start with a few pragmatic moves.
They can first design a migration path from opt-in security to 2FA by default. That path often includes an education phase, a staged rollout with clear UI prompts, and metric-driven tracking of how many accounts actually complete enrollment. During this phase, product teams should work hand-in-hand with security engineers, because UX decisions around prompts, fallback options, and error messages directly influence enrollment rates.
Additionally, providers can modernize factor choices. They can treat SMS codes as a legacy option and prioritize authenticators, app-based prompts, and passkeys for webmail. That shift reduces SIM-swap exposure and makes phishing less lucrative. Providers can then invest in secure, well-documented recovery processes that use identity checks, device history, and careful human review instead of guessable questions and weak backup channels.
Finally, providers can document their approach in language that regulators, partners, and users understand. When they describe how default 2FA, passkeys, strong passwords, and recovery flows fit together, they turn a compliance obligation into a visible part of their value proposition. That transparency matches both BSI’s expectations and ENISA’s emphasis on clear communication around account security.
𝐅𝐀𝐐𝐬
Q: Why does Germany want 2FA enabled by default instead of just recommending it?
A: Because opt-in models fail at scale. Most users never dig through settings menus to enable two-factor authentication, even when they understand the risk. Default 2FA shifts the baseline so that users start from a secure position, then adjust factors rather than build security themselves.
Q: Does this proposal only affect German email users?
A: Primarily, BSI targets providers that serve users in Germany. However, many webmail services operate globally, and they prefer consistent authentication models. As a result, a Germany 2FA by default webmail push can indirectly raise the security baseline for users in other regions as well.
Q: How does default 2FA interact with privacy and data protection rules?
A: Strong authentication complements privacy law. Email often carries personal and sensitive data, and regulators already expect controllers to protect that data with appropriate technical measures. Telecommunications cybersecurity rules, NIS2 expectations, and ENISA guidance all point toward multi-factor authentication as one of those measures.
Q: Are SMS codes still acceptable for webmail login?
A: SMS still improves security compared to password-only logins, so many providers keep it as a fallback. However, agencies and security practitioners increasingly recommend app-based factors, hardware tokens, or passkeys for webmail because they resist more modern attacks, including SIM swapping and real-time phishing kits.
Q: What should a small provider do if it lacks resources for a full passkey rollout?
A: Smaller providers can still improve webmail security by enabling TOTP-based authenticators by default, tightening rate limits, and documenting secure recovery flows. They can then plan a staged move toward passkeys, possibly by integrating with existing identity providers that already support modern FIDO2 infrastructure.
