In a recent campaign, the Iran-linked APT MuddyWater revived its operations with a sneaky twist: a malware loader masquerading as a vintage video game. The group deployed the loader disguised as the retro “Snake” game against a range of Israeli organizations, demonstrating a growing sophistication in both social-engineering and defense evasion.
The evolving MuddyWater threat model
MuddyWater (also known as TA450 / Mango Sandstorm) has operated since at least 2017, targeting governments, telecoms, and critical-infrastructure firms across the Middle East and beyond. Historically its campaigns leaned on spear-phishing and macro-enabled documents; now, with this retro-game tactic, it shows a willingness to refine its lures and lower technical noise.
By adopting a seemingly innocuous game as a loader, MuddyWater reduces suspicion and evades many perimeter and logistic-based detections.
Inside the retro-game malware loader
In the observed campaign, the loader called Fooder appears to victims as a harmless “Snake”-style game executable. Once launched, the game UI distracts the user, while in the background, Fooder decrypts and loads a memory-only backdoor named MuddyViper.
That dual nature game UI + hidden loader masks the attack chain and lowers detection chances by sandboxes and endpoint security tools.
New obfuscation and execution techniques
Fooder doesn’t simply drop files to disk; it reflectively loads its payload into memory, avoiding the obvious footprints that disk-based malware leaves behind. It also uses obfuscation and custom delay logic, mimicking game behavior to avoid heuristic and behavioral analysis. According to ESET’s research, Fooder often delays execution using functions analogous to the Snake game’s logic blending malicious behavior inside benign-looking operations. As a result, many traditional static-signature or heuristic-based defenses may fail to detect the loader before it executes its payload.
Command-and-control flexibility and persistence
Once MuddyViper loads, it enables remote shell access, credential theft (browser and Windows credentials), data exfiltration, and general post-exploitation control. The campaign reportedly spread across a wide set of targets: 17 Israeli organizations spanning universities, engineering firms, local government, technology, transportation, utilities, manufacturing plus one confirmed Egyptian company. MuddyWater avoided hands-on keyboard activity, leaning on fully automated loaders and memory-only malware, which improves stealth and reduces opportunities for human error.
Why the retro-game lure works so effectively
The retro-game loader combines cultural nostalgia, low suspicion, and functional disguise. Employees receiving a file named like a game are far more likely to run it than a suspicious “update.exe” or “installer.exe.” Because the payload runs in memory and lacks installer signatures or registry footprints, many endpoint-protection tools may miss it entirely. Security teams that monitor only for known malware filenames or installation behavior might never see the compromise begin.
Indicators tied to this MuddyWater campaign
Based on research from ESET and reporting on the campaign:
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The loader named “Fooder” disguised as Snake-like game executables.
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Backdoor “MuddyViper” active in memory after execution.
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Exfiltration of Windows login credentials, browser data, and use of custom cryptographic APIs (CNG) for encryption/decryption.
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Use of free file-sharing / RMM installers (hosted on public platforms) as phishing lures to deliver the initial loader.
Security teams should treat any unusual game-like executables received via suspicious email or file-sharing links as high-risk, and perform memory and process-based forensics if a system exhibits odd behavior after running such files.
Targeting focus: why Israeli organizations were hit
MuddyWater’s choice of Israeli critical infrastructure, government-adjacent, academic and technology sectors aligns with its historical victimology. The diversity, from universities to engineering firms to local governments suggests MuddyWater aims broadly at information gathering, perhaps for geopolitical intelligence or long-term access to sensitive networks.
Defensive guidance and mitigation strategies
To defend against this evolving tactic, organizations should:
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Enforce strict application control policies to block or sandbox executables that masquerade as games or unknown software.
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Monitor for memory-only backdoors use EDR tools that detect anomalous in-memory execution rather than relying solely on disk signatures.
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Treat any unsolicited executable, especially from unverified sources or file-sharing links, as suspicious, even if it appears benign.
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Validate and restrict remote-management and RMM-style installer distribution; avoid using free file-sharing platforms for trusted software deliveries.
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Incorporate behavioral and network-based detection for credential theft, unusual outbound connections, and data exfiltration.
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Provide user training remind staff that games or entertainment-style files can act as malware carriers.
What this campaign signals about future APT tradecraft
MuddyWater’s use of a retro-game loader shows a clear shift: APTs are willing to get creative, blending cultural familiarity with technical stealth. This tactic lowers initial suspicion and weaponizes memory-only payloads, making detection harder and giving attackers better opportunities to achieve persistence. Future campaigns may lean more on interactive lures: custom media players, harmless-looking utilities, “productivity” tools all carrying hidden malware. Security teams must adapt accordingly.
FAQs
What exactly is the retro-game loader used by MuddyWater?
The loader named “Fooder” disguises itself as a Snake-style video game. When a user runs it, they see a game UI. Meanwhile, in the background, Fooder decrypts and loads a memory-only backdoor called “MuddyViper,” avoiding disk footprints and many signature-based detections.
Can MuddyWater compromise systems even if the user doesn’t “install” anything obvious?
Yes. Because Fooder and MuddyViper run in memory and avoid dropping recognizable files, traditional defenses focused on installers or disk artifacts may miss the infection.
How can defenders detect or block this kind of attack?
Use behavior-based EDR that spots in-memory execution, implement strict application whitelisting or sandboxing, monitor network for unusual outbound connections or credential exfiltration, and treat unsolicited executables even “games” as potential threats.
Does this mean games are now a common vector for advanced threats?
Not yet at “common,” but this campaign demonstrates that threat actors are experimenting with entertainment-style lures. As APTs evolve, defenders must assume any file type including games can carry malware.
What sectors should be especially concerned about this campaign?
Organizations in critical infrastructure, local government, technology, education, manufacturing, and any group with sensitive data or strategic value especially those in or connected to Israel, the Middle East, or regions of geopolitical interest.
