Security teams track domains, IPs, and payloads every day. Yet upstream connectivity often decides whether malicious infrastructure dies fast or lives comfortably. In 2025, aurologic GmbH operating AS30823 from Langen, Germany connected a dense cluster of high-risk networks. Consequently, command-and-control and bulletproof-style hosting kept stable reach, even as takedowns and sanctions hit downstream entities. Therefore, defenders should treat upstream relationships as first-class risk not a background detail.
𝗕𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 “𝗡𝗲𝘅𝘂𝘀” 𝗟𝗮𝗯𝗲𝗹 — AS30823, Tornado Datacenter, and a multi-terabit footprint
aurologic markets a multi-terabit backbone, IP transit, DDoS protection, and colocation. It anchors operations in Tornado Datacenter (FRA1) in Langen near Frankfurt, while maintaining reach across Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland. Because AS30823 peers broadly and sells upstream to smaller networks, policy choices at this single provider ripple through many abuse-heavy ASNs. Moreover, aurologic presents itself as “neutral” connectivity and emphasizes legal compliance. However, neutral framing does not erase enablement risk when the same upstream repeatedly props up networks with sustained malware presence.
𝗗𝗼𝘄𝗻𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗺 𝗰𝗹𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿 — metaspinner net GmbH, Femo IT Solutions, Global-Data System IT Corporation, Railnet, and Aeza
Threat activity enablers (TAEs) concentrate under aurologic’s umbrella. Researchers mapped repeated routing from aurologic to metaspinner net GmbH, Femo IT Solutions Ltd, Global-Data System IT Corporation (SWISSNETWORK02), Railnet LLC, and Aeza Group. Additionally, telemetry tied these ASNs to commodity loaders (TinyLoader, SmokeLoader), stealers (Rhadamanthys, RedLine, Lumma, Stealc), and toolkits such as QuasarRAT, AsyncRAT, REMCOS, and Cobalt Strike. Consequently, upstream stability at aurologic translated into resilient reach for malware control and staging.
𝗔𝗲𝘇𝗮 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘀𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 — upstream persistence despite pressure
Sanctions hit Aeza in the US and UK. Yet routing snapshots still showed heavy Aeza dependence on aurologic for global connectivity, with roughly half of Aeza International’s announced prefixes flowing through AS30823 during the study window. Because upstreams sit close to the backbone, their policy either constrains or sustains sanctioned entities. Therefore, upstream controls contract clauses, risk thresholds, and rapid de-peering playbooks matter as much as any downstream abuse desk.
𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘂𝗽𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗺𝘀 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿 — “legal neutrality” vs operational responsibility
Upstreams claim neutrality. However, repeat patterns tell a different story: when the same upstream keeps high-abuse ASNs reachable, botnets phone home, phishing kits stay up, and payload delivery chains remain smooth. Meanwhile, abuse desks that act only on court orders or narrow takedown notices leave wide gray zones untouched. Consequently, an attacker who anticipates shallow enforcement simply shifts prefixes, reannounces routes, and continues operations with minimal friction.
𝗥𝗶𝘀𝗸 𝗺𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗹 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗯𝗹𝘂𝗲 𝘁𝗲𝗮𝗺𝘀 — treat upstream relationships as control points
Because upstreams shape survivability, SOC and CTI teams should track them explicitly. Map actor kits to origin ASNs, then to their first upstreams. Next, score upstreams for “abuse persistence” across months, not days. Additionally, enrich detections with route-origin and upstream metadata so EDR, firewall, and proxy layers block faster when familiar bad families appear behind familiar upstreams. Finally, create escalation paths for peering abuse: when upstreams cross defined thresholds, your organization should de-prioritize peering, push community disclosures, or block entire upstream cones during active campaigns.
𝗗𝗲𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗼𝗯𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 — turn BGP and hosting context into alerts
Start with route context: alert when known malware families resurface behind AS30823 or its prominent downstream TAEs. Then, watch for rapid prefix churn where the origin ASN stays the same but the upstream flips back to aurologic after temporary disruption. Furthermore, add indicators for “mirror” infrastructure fresh /24s announced by the same TAE that reuse identical TLS JA3s, HTTP titles, or panel paths. Meanwhile, track aurologic-advertised services (DDoS protection, remote scrubbing) and flag attackers who hide in that traffic mix. Consequently, blended signal upstream + content + behavior yields stronger, earlier catches.
𝗦𝗵𝗼𝗿𝘁-𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗺 𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘂𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 — block cones, deny by default, and coordinate action
Today, enforce deny-by-default for risky upstream cones during live intrusions. Also, auto-quarantine flows to fresh prefixes announced by TAEs routed through aurologic until reputation stabilizes. Additionally, coordinate with your ISP on RTBH, flowspec, and scrubbing to blunt DDoS sourced from abuse-heavy ranges. Because actors reuse hosting playbooks, a modest set of upstream-focused rules cuts considerable noise immediately.
𝗟𝗼𝗻𝗴-𝗴𝗮𝗺𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗲 — procurement levers and peering policy
Beyond SOC rules, pull on contracts and policy. Require upstream providers to meet abuse SLAs, disclose downstream relationships exceeding defined risk scores, and document de-peering triggers. Moreover, embed sanctions compliance clauses that bite when evidence shows sustained enablement of designated entities. Finally, share upstream analytics with ISACs and community lists so abuse-tolerant transit arrangements face higher reputational and business cost over time.
Attackers do not need stealth when infrastructure enjoys upstream stability. Consequently, defenders should shift part of the fight to where connectivity hardens or collapses. Track upstreams. Score them. Pressure them. And route your own buying and peering decisions toward networks that pair performance with proven abuse-response discipline.
FAQs
Q1: Why focus on an upstream like aurologic instead of the malware IPs alone?
A1: Because upstream stability keeps threat infrastructure reachable. When the same transit provider persists, C2s and staging hosts survive takedowns. Therefore, upstream-aware blocking and procurement pressure reduce attacker uptime.
Q2: How do we detect this in practice without false positives?
A2: Combine BGP context with content signals. Accordingly, alert on families (Cobalt Strike, QuasarRAT, Lumma, RedLine) that reappear behind AS30823 or its downstream TAEs, and confirm with TLS/HTTP fingerprints and panel paths.
Q3: What should we do during an active incident?
A3: Temporarily block the offending upstream cone; apply RTBH or flowspec with your carrier; rate-limit flows from newly announced prefixes tied to those TAEs; and notify your peers to accelerate pressure on the transit layer.
Q4: How does sanctions policy play into this?
A4: Sanctions increase pressure; however, routing persists when upstreams continue service. Consequently, align network policy and procurement with sanctions intelligence so connectivity to designated entities drops quickly.
